Current Issue
Volume 1, Issue 5
The newest papers published in the Student Journal of Business and Economics. Each has its own permanent, original SJBE DOI and is freely citable, anywhere.
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15 Nov 2026
The drive to explore is in everyone's hearts, fueled by adrenaline from being challenged in difficult situations and by the realization of how much people have achieved during the 20th and 21st centuries. The 20th-century Space Race was about being a leader and establishing dominance in space. However, the 21st century is all about Artificial Intelligence (AI); it is growing day by day. Individuals, businesses, and governments are pouring hundreds of billions of dollars into AI to achieve different goals. SpaceX and Blue Origin are competing to capture a larger market share in the space field, developing and improving the commercial space industry. This article will include an analysis of investment decisions between Artificial Intelligence giants like NVIDIA and Google and Space Industry professionals like SpaceX. So the question is, if you had a billion dollars, where would you invest your money: to the Moon or to the Bubble?
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Despite a shared British common-law system, geography, culture and colonial background, Singapore's and Malaysia's economies diverged from the 1970s onwards. As they shared largely similar contracting institutions, this paper investigates whether property rights institutions can help explain this split. While existing literature examines the New Economic Policy (NEP) and Industrial Co-ordination Act (ICA) mainly as ethnic redistribution policies, this paper analyses them as a property rights institution shock under the institutions framework. The ICA enforced the NEP's 30 per cent Bumiputera (Malays and other indigenous groups) equity target and ethnic restructuring of managerial and professional employment through manufacturing licence conditions. Current studies also examine the NEP within Malaysia in isolation. This paper uses a difference-in-differences design with Singapore serving as a counterfactual to compare the share of the ethnic Chinese workforce in professional, managerial, administrative and technical (PMAT) occupations. From 1970 to 1990, Malaysian Chinese PMAT share grew 11.1 percentage points less than in Singapore. This gap is consistent with the NEP/ICA slowing Chinese occupational growth, assuming the parallel trends assumption holds. A robustness check on Malay workers gives the opposite sign (+1.8), consistent with an ethnically targeted policy. A triple difference using economy-wide occupational data tests for the presence of "Ali Baba" arrangements, which are associated with extractive institutions. Its evidence on such arrangements is mixed, but the Chinese share grew more slowly than in Singapore in both occupational tiers, suggesting the slower growth was not only due to nominal title transfers from Ali Baba arrangements.
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07 Nov 2026
This paper studies how third-degree price discrimination impacts the Nash equilibrium of a duopolistic Bertrand model in differentiated markets. The model looks at two automobile producers, one based in the UK and the other based in the EU, competing in two different markets (Ireland and Britain). The European Union producer faces a tariff only in the British market, while the United Kingdom producer faces no tariff in either of the markets. By calculating both firms' best-response functions, this study compares the equilibrium prices and quantities under geographic price discrimination and a uniform price system. The results show that price discrimination results in the tariff increasing both producers' equilibrium prices in Britain, while leaving prices in the Irish market unchanged. This leaves the cost shock isolated in the British market. Additionally, the tariff increases the British producer's equilibrium quantity demanded while reducing the EU producer's quantity demanded. However, under uniform pricing, the tariff results in a cross-market spillover, increasing equilibrium prices in Ireland, set by both producers, despite the absence of a tariff in that market.
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07 Nov 2026
Buying a company is not instant. After a merger agreement is signed, it can take months before the deal closes and ownership changes hands. During that time, markets can fall, buyers can lose their nerve, and money can disappear. This paper asks how the protective clauses in buyout contracts insulate transactions from severe operational disruptions during this waiting period. It studies three real cases: Elon Musk's 2022 deal to buy Twitter, Bank of America's purchase of Merrill Lynch during the 2008 financial crisis, and the fight between Dow Chemical and Rohm and Haas in 2008 and 2009. Across these cases, the paper looks at three contract tools. The first is the material adverse effect (MAE) clause, an escape hatch that buyers can use only after a severe, lasting blow to the target company. The second is the ordinary course requirement, which obliges the target company to keep running its business normally until closing. The third is specific performance, a court order that forces a party to complete the deal. The paper finds that in these high-profile deals, these rules often worked as safety guardrails. They tend to discourage buyers from backing out simply because the market turns bad, offer paths to manage risk under serious losses, and frequently protect sellers if a buyer's cash suddenly vanishes.