Original Research Article

Robotics vs. Generative AI: Why They Exhibit Differing Labour Market Effects in Australia

Sabeer Virdi

Killara High School, Koola Avenue, Killara, Sydney, New South Wales, 2071, Australia

sabeervirdi@gmail.com

ABSTRACT

This paper analyses the differing labour market effects created by industrial robotics and generative Artificial Intelligence (AI) within the Australian economy. While industrial robotics and generative AI are often aggregated under the singular banner term of "automation," treating them as a homogenous phenomenon downplays their radically divergent transmission mechanisms. By utilising a task-based framework, this paper argues that these two technologies propagate via entirely distinct tracks within the Australian economy; automation is not one overall phenomenon, but rather has a multifaceted dual-track impact, stemming from the automation of individual tasks as opposed to whole jobs.

Track 1 investigates the substitution forces of robotics within sectors like mining and manufacturing. The capital intensive and highly structured nature of robotics implementation can introduce concentrated labour market displacement shocks that are felt within local communities.

Track 2 examines the geographically diffused augmentation effects of generative AI across the services sector, specifically finance and retail. Driven by low-friction, decentralised implementation, generative AI can cause an uneven wave of task transformation and restructuring as opposed to systemic job elimination.

Via a qualitative review of domestic sectoral data, this study explores how productivity gains realised at a national macro-level fail to capture the localised socioeconomic disruptions and adjustments observed at the community and firm level.

By disaggregating these technological mechanisms, this paper leverages Australia's distinct sectoral landscape to clarify the globally evolving friction between technological replacement and human reinstatement. In relation to controlling externalities, this paper uses the same disaggregation to conclude that because automation is not a singular process, labour market adaptation cannot be a singular response either.

Keywords: AI; Robotics; Labour Market; Australia

INTRODUCTION

Defining the Question

Why are robotics and generative AI producing different labour market effects in Australia?

This paper inquires about the causal factors being the unique impacts associated with the adoption of robotics and generative AI, in the specific context of major sectors in Australia. While both technologies fall under the broad umbrella of automation, they propagate via structurally distinct economic transmission mechanisms.

Industrial robotics tend to act primarily as a direct substitute for routine manual and physical tasks, frequently precipitating localised displacement shocks. However, generative AI functions predominantly to complement and augment cognitive task bundles. Rather than outright eliminating professional roles, generative AI tends more towards reshaping job profiles, shifting human labour toward high-value capabilities and creating complex productivity and labour reinstatement dynamics.

Why is Australia Important?

The Australian economy provides a unique location to study these technological transitions. Its structural composition is largely dependent on two sectors, characterised by a capital-intensive, geographically isolated mining sector alongside geographically widespread, finance and retail sectors. This allows for the simultaneous investigation of both automation tracks within a single country. Highly advanced automation technologies such as industrial robotics can be correlated with higher unemployment and wage growth within the sectors that are exposed to it significantly.[1] Conversely, domestic data indicates that generative AI reconfigures job compositions across white-collar occupations.[2] These shifts create divergent structural impacts in the labour market, driving a "hollowing out" effect within middle-skill profiles, decreasing demand for most administrative and entry-level positions, and causing increasing labour market complexity.

The Central Question

Despite the rapidly increasing body of research tied to the technological revolution of automation, there remains a significant gap. Researchers have failed to regard the cause and effect of different types of automation especially within the Australian context. Current scholarly discussions often aggregate "automation" into a singular phenomenon, failing to distinguish between the substitution mechanics of industrial robotics and the augmentation potential of generative AI.

Corresponding author: Sabeer Virdi, E-mail: sabeervirdi@gmail.com

Accepted September 12, 2026
ISSN: 3144-0363
https://doi.org/110.67521/sjbe.2026.003

Crucially, as Brynjolfsson, Chandar, and Chen (2025) demonstrate in their work on early AI employment effects, aggregating these phenomena obscures the distinct "canary" signals of task shifting.[3] This paper addresses this gap by applying Brynjolfsson's theoretical boundaries regarding substitution versus augmentation directly to the ramifications of Australia's unique sectoral composition.

By using international studies to build the foundation, this paper leverages an analytically valuable perspective from Australia's sectoral composition, with heavy reliance on mining, manufacturing, retail, and finance, creating a strategically useful case that provides insight via qualitative review from largely domestic sources into the simultaneous impacts of automation adoption.

Contribution

This paper contributes in three ways.

1. It explicitly implements knowledge to boundaries separating physical robotic substitution from cognitive software-driven augmentation.
2. It projects the established Acemoglu-Autor-Brynjolfsson task-based framework directly onto modern Australian sectoral data.
3. It demonstrates that Australia's primary structural risk is not aggregate, systemic unemployment, but rather severe localised displacement and a widening institutional reinstatement gap across disparate geographical regions.

METHODOLOGY

This paper employs a qualitative comparative case study design, structured around a task-based theoretical framework. The paper synthesises secondary data such as government labour statistics, industry and consultancy reports, academic literature, and documented firm-level events to assess whether the observed patterns of labour market disruptions in Australia are consistent with a "dual-track" typology of automation. The paper analyses secondary sources to identify patterns of task displacement, task augmentation, and skill reallocation. This design is appropriate due to the lack of Australia-specific econometric studies isolating the causal employment effects of robotics versus generative AI, but it necessarily constrains the strength of the causal claims the paper is able to make.

Evidence is weighted primarily towards peer-reviewed economic research and official data from bodies such as Jobs and Skills Australia, the Australian Bureau of Statistics, and the Productivity Commission. International theoretical models, specifically task-based automation frameworks, are used to establish foundational concepts, while domestic industry data illustrates the sector-specific dynamics in Australia, including two sectoral pairs to represent each track: mining and manufacturing (Track 1, robotics) and retail and finance (Track 2, generative AI). These sectors were selected on the following criteria:

1. Combined contribution of over 25% to Australian GDP for macroeconomic relevance;
2. Availability of sector-specific automation data;
3. A priori theoretical fit since sectors dominated respectively by physical task bundles and cognitive task bundles.

By evaluating how physical robotics substitute for manual tasks while generative AI reconfigures cognitive task bundles, this paper outlines the structural mechanisms through which automation shapes contemporary Australian labour dynamics.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Foundation

To fully understand the structural impact of automation, our analysis must transition from a job-level perspective to a task-based framework.[4] Via this model, a "job" is represented as a bundle of tasks rather than an indivisible unit of labour. Within any given job, there are many separate and unique actions executed by the worker. These may range from codifiable routine functions to non-routine analytical judgements. Automation unbundles these positions, as implementation of capital does not always replace whole jobs, but instead replaces certain tasks within their job, which in turn may replace the whole job depending on their underlying technological requirements.[5]

Under this framework, technological disruption propagates through the labour market via three distinct vectors:

1. *Substitution* refers to the complete replacement of a job, due to all/most tasks in the bundle being automatable for a lower cost.
2. *Complementarity* involves the advent of technology improving the ability of current human labour to perform their tasks.
3. *Augmentation* involves technology partially replacing some tasks within a job bundle, creating the opportunity for human labour to perform better/with higher productivity.

Due to modern automation targeting individual task characteristics rather than wiping out whole occupations, it unbundles traditional roles.

For instance, rather than replacing an entire corporate administrative role, generative artificial intelligence (AI) tools are leveraged to optimise individual actions, such as isolating data or formatting digital spreadsheets.

This is a direct mirror to the findings of Brynjolfsson et al. (2025), who observe that industries with high AI exposure do not immediately exhibit negative employment shocks. Instead, these highly exposed fields act as "canaries in the coal mine" for rapid task re-allocation, where the baseline occupational title remains intact but the underlying task bundle is reconfigured to focus on non-routine human capabilities.[6]

The dual-track impact observed in Australia appears to stem from modern technology not automating jobs in their entirety; but unbundling them, targeting specific tasks within the bundle based on their codifiability.

To establish the framework of the paper's inquiry, it is necessary to define and distinguish between the two distinct tracks of robotic automation and AI automation.

Robotics refers to the usage of physical machines in order to substitute manual human labour for performing tasks that require precision and repetition without mistakes and with high consistency.

This represents Track 1, wherein industrial robotics usually exhibits a higher substitution propensity, effectively removing routine or heavy, manual-labour focused tasks from the bundle. For jobs involving heavy labour tasks, this automation often represents the core of their role, which may heighten risk of total displacement, and potentially lead to a geographically concentrated labour market impact.

Generative AI is a shift towards automated thinking. It has the ability to alter clerical and administrative tasks by utilising Large Language Models to synthesise new content and mimic human reasoning.

This represents Track 2, wherein Generative AI usually exhibits a higher augmentation propensity within cognitive bundles. It takes over routine tasks, such as data synthesis or draft generation, while simultaneously increasing the marginal productivity of the remaining human-specific tasks, such as high-level strategy and ethical oversight, leading to geographically diffused and augmentation dominant changes in the labour market.

This process of unbundling jobs and their tasks explains why Australia is seeing an uneven labour market breakdown, as while some workers see their entire "bundle" rendered obsolete by robotics (production), others find their roles made more valuable by AI (services).

Complementarity Hypothesis and the Polanyi Paradox

A central part of understanding the transition of the labour market via technology is recognising that automation does not simply destroy jobs. As Autor argues, automation substitutes for labour in some tasks but also complements labour and raises output, which increases labour demand in other areas.[4] Historically, fears of mass unemployment, such as the ATM Paradox of the 1970s, when it was widely predicted that bank teller professions would be wiped out, have not materialised because new technologies consistently create new tasks and industries. (In the case of the ATM paradox, between 1980 and 2010, the number of ATMs in the U.S. grew from nearly zero to over 400,000. Concurrently, the number of bank tellers actually increased from 500,000 to approximately 600,000 in that same period.)

Autor argues that technological shifts are seldom a "zero-sum" issue for the labour market. He suggests that when technology automates a specific task, it does not necessarily eliminate the worker; rather, it increases the value of the tasks that only humans can perform.

Automation often replaces routine tasks but enhances the productivity of workers performing non-routine tasks, leading to task reallocation rather than total elimination. This reflects the Polanyi Paradox, which highlights that humans excel at tasks that are hard to codify, such as judgment, intuition, and social interaction. Higher productivity also means lower prices and higher demand, which can lead to higher derived demand for labour in industries that complement automation, including programming, IT, and banking. Elastic demand, the creation of new tasks, and labour supply adjustments through retraining and industry shifts all help explain why there are still so many jobs despite continuous technological change. Autor notes that fears of unemployment are ages old, yet aggregate unemployment has continued to grow rather than collapse, suggesting that the key challenge is managing the transition rather than confronting long-term job scarcity.[4]

The Displacement Effect vs. Reinstatement Mechanism

Moving forward from Autor's perspective, the contrasting evidence from Acemoglu and Restrepo helps clarify why the current wave of automation presents a more complex challenge for Australia.[7]

Labour Demand = Displacement Effect + Productivity Effect + Reinstatement Effect

This formula directly turns the concepts from Section 3.1 to measurable economic forces. These three effects serve as the mechanisms that execute the broader forces of Substitution, Complementarity, and Augmentation across the labour market.

1. *The Displacement Effect:* The direct substitution of capital for human labour in tasks previously performed by workers. This shifts the industrial labour share downward and reduces aggregate employment and wage growth within affected sectors.
2. *The Productivity Effect:* Cost reductions achieved via automation expand the scale of industry production, increasing the demand for human labour in non-automated tasks within the same sector or across the broader economy.
3. *The Reinstatement Effect:* The structural creation of entirely new, more complex tasks in which human labour possesses a comparative advantage over capital, effectively expanding the occupational boundary and restoring the labour share.

They argue that when technology acts as a direct substitute for human labour without creating sufficient new tasks, it leads to a net decline in employment and wages.

Their research shows that robots reduce both employment and wages, with one additional robot per 1000 workers lowering the employment to population ratio by 0.2 percent and reducing wages by 0.42 percent.[1]

Unlike earlier technologies that mainly complemented labour, robots act as direct substitutes for workers in routine, manual, and repetitive tasks.

This displacement is strongest in regions with high manufacturing employment and greater exposure to industries adopting robotics.

Robots replace entire tasks rather than assisting workers, and the productivity gains they generate do not create enough new human tasks to offset the jobs lost. This can be associated with

concentrated regional job shocks, weaker bargaining power for middle skill workers, and uneven distributional effects that fall most heavily on workers without university qualifications.

These findings highlight that while automation can raise productivity, it can also create significant short term labour market disruptions that require targeted policy responses.

Thus is defined the Task-Based Framework.

Task Reallocation

The Task-Based Framework reveals the truth that AI reallocates tasks within and across occupations, as opposed to simply eliminating jobs.

In their 2018 paper, Acemoglu and Restrepo define the "task as a unit of production":

"The central feature of our framework is that it is tasks, not goods, that require the combination of capital and labor... Automation is the expansion of the set of tasks that can be produced by capital."

This framework paints the image that labour demand is derived from the allocation of specific "tasks" to either capital or humans, rather than the elimination of jobs. AI represents an expansion of the capability of capital, creating less demand for human labour, linked to the Displacement Effect. This is counteracted by the Productivity Effect, where the resultant costs (based on market forces) for human labour are lower, therefore eventually increasing demand, and the Reinstatement Effect that leads to the creation of complex jobs that can only be fulfilled by human labour.

The Task-Based Framework suggests a link between automated tasks and the labour market, explaining job polarisation and the hollowing effect observed within a modern automated economy. High skill, non-routine tasks that require originality and deep thinking are barely impacted, possibly having their value increased due to AI, while low value/skill tasks, typically mundane services, such as in-person hospitality, physical shelf-stocking, or bespoke customer assistance, are difficult to automate and thus are also marginally impacted.

However, unlike the poles of this spectrum, the middle-skill tasks, typically routine, administrative work are very susceptible to automation, as they directly match to the skillset possessed by AI—the ability to navigate and organise large swathes of data, or to consistently conduct the same task without error.

This theoretical divergence provides a lens through which we can examine the impacts of two distinct types of automation on the Australian labour market, where the combination of high-output sectors that involve manual labour and administrative work intersect, creating a multi-pronged impact on the domestic labour market.

THE AUSTRALIAN CONTEXT

Why are Robotics and Generative AI having an impact that is so unique to Australia?

As mentioned in Section 1.2, the Australian sectoral makeup presents a unique laboratory to investigate individual and combined impacts of two distinct types of automation.

The Australian labour market is currently navigating this dual-track technological shift. While industrial robotics continues to displace routine physical labour, Generative AI is introducing a fundamentally different dynamic characterised by task augmentation and cognitive reshaping.

Why the paper's core argument matters specifically for Australia: our economic stability relies on a delicate balance between the two tracks, defined by the major sectors within the Australian economy, which are undergoing two vastly different technology adoption cycles.

Major Sectors

To analyse the impacts on the Australian labour markets, we must explore the two most prominent sectors that have been transformed by the advent of robotics and generative AI and their sub-sectors.

Mining and Manufacturing represent Track 1 and Retail and Finance represent Track 2, and together they account for approximately 30% of Australia's GDP and over 2.5 million jobs, making them the primary staging grounds for technological disruption.[2]

The Australian export wealth is generated by industries (Mining and Agriculture), with recent trends expressing a structured contraction in employee counts.[8]

This trend aligns with the patterns of direct substitution of robotics and is potentially attributable to the high-capital requirements of robotic integration, reflective of a highly concentrated and calculated wave of structural adoption.[9]

Australia's domestic employment is dominated by services (Retail and Finance) that are currently undergoing a patchy transformation that has also seen an uneven loss of jobs via AI, due to the main drivers being individual employees experimenting and routine jobs being enhanced while certain firms attempt to automate human interaction and things such as order placement, reflecting comparatively minor job losses.[10]

Uneven Adoption

Resulting from the high-friction and capital intensive nature of Track 1's calculated adoption, we can see a regional disparity in labour displacement as firms switch one by one in large bursts.

In contrast, the adoption of GenAI within the domestic service sector appears more diffuse and incremental, suggesting that the labour market effects in these industries are more likely to manifest as task-restructuring rather than immediate, aggregate job loss.[11]

EVIDENCE AND ANALYSIS

This section breaks down Australia's technological transitions at 3 main levels, and concludes that the Australian economy is experiencing a dual-track impact in their threat to unemployment and examines the distinct adoption cycles of robotics and generative AI.

Distilling the Broader Trends

Mining, manufacturing and logistics are generally at the highest risk of automation due to robotics, as they demand physical and

highly consistent tasks that are easy to code and automate.

Mining has already capitalised on this, utilising remote operation and autonomous vehicles that reduce labour requirements and liabilities, transforming the sector.

On the contrary, heavily logistical sectors such as retail are being alternatively reshaped via AI, as generative models and automation tools are changing how cognitive and administrative work is performed. Administrative roles within the retail industry are especially exposed to automation, though adoption remains uneven due to the majority of the AI tool usage being the aforementioned individual workflow experimentation, causing a patchy transformation, unlike mining, and subsequently coinciding with the inconsistent displacement represented in recent sectoral data.

International vs. Australia

Empirical studies from the United States and Europe provide evidence that industrial robots and automation technologies exhibit the displacement effect on employment and wages, particularly in routine blue-collar roles. Acemoglu & Restrepo (2020) estimate that each additional robot per 1,000 workers reduces the local employment-to-population ratio by 0.2 percentage points and average wages by 0.42%.[1] These effects are most pronounced in manufacturing-heavy industries and among workers without tertiary qualifications. While global robot installations are projected to grow by 6% in 2025 and surpass the 700,000 unit mark by 2028, the primary challenge remains a reinstatement gap, where the productivity gains from automation have historically failed to create new human tasks quickly enough to offset those lost to the machine.

Australia's own adoption of robotic automation mirrors the global trends, impacting workers lacking tertiary education, however they are impacted by local nuance. The mining sector is a global leader in the utilisation of aforementioned automation via remote-controlled and autonomous trucks, which has significantly increased productivity and has had a profound impact on productivity and output with the Australian mining automation market reaching $715.9 million in 2024 and growing at 9.6% annually.[12]

Australia presents a highly instructive, dual-track economic case study. Economic stability as a whole may increasingly rely on policies maintaining a balance between capturing the potential productivity generated by the robotics track while mitigating the geographic and socioeconomic friction of the AI track.

The difference in skill requirements and specialisations between the two tracks pronounces the impact of job polarisation normally caused by capital replacement of labour.

In Track 1, middle-skilled, manual-labour focused positions face an acute barrier to structural transition; the skills tied to heavy machinery operation or manual trades possess low mobility into emerging high-wage technical sectors. When direct task substitution by industrial robotics displaces these mid-tier blue-collar roles, affected workers often face a steep, cost-intensive educational bridge to cross.

Without substantial retraining, these individuals are frequently forced downwards into low-skill, low-wage manual services, compressing wages at the bottom of the income distribution.

Conversely, middle-skilled positions within Track 2 undergo an upward sorting mechanism. Because software-driven generative AI integrates seamlessly into existing white-collar workflows, the technology acts as an intellectual accelerator rather than a barrier to entry. This augmentation effect provides an accessible, low-friction avenue for administrative and clerical employees to elevate their output, transforming routine clerical workers into high-value data overseers and analytical coordinators. This dynamic aligns with the polarisation literature by Autor (2015), demonstrating that while both tracks may systematically hollow out traditional middle-skill occupations, Track 1 tends towards triggering downward displacement due to rigid asset and skill barriers, whereas Track 2 generally pulls adaptable human capital upward into augmented, high-premium professional roles.[4]

Robotics and Major Displacement: Track 1

In Track 1, robots act as a substitutionary force against physical labourers. It is defined by high barriers to entry and highly structured implementation, derived from a management of stakeholder desires, creating a transformation that is highly visible and distinctly restricted to certain regions.

Adoption of robotics and automation in sectors such as Mining (9.9% of GDP) and Manufacturing (5.7% of GDP) is highly capital intensive, as robotics are pricey and difficult to implement, and often require comprehensive systems to operate at max efficiency. This demands standardised adoption across a large site (in the case of mining), which then impacts where to finance it from, the $715.9 million mining automation highlighting the expensive nature of the infrastructure required.[13,32]

This additionally contributes to slower implementation, as larger decisions at a corporate and firm-level scale require several individuals along a control chain to agree, creating a distinct lag between technological availability and regional labour displacement.

A decreased adoption rate can also be coupled with a hesitance to commit to a current technology, as reworking and switching current infrastructure is another costly feature, and betting too early on an emerging market might show immediate returns but the competitive advantage may fade as competitors who held their money purchase more sophisticated technology later.

Consequently, this culminates in patchy and regional displacement shocks. While the benefits of productivity gains are felt at a national level, the negative externalities of labour displacement are felt heavily by local communities.

As the capital investment in 2024 of $4.2 billion AUD gets spent in a short burst across individual sites, developments such as those in the Pilbara region of Western Australia (now hosting 75% of the world's autonomous trucks) has created a gap.[14,29] While productivity gains are felt nationally, the negative externalities of job loss are felt intensely within a local community, making the impact immediately visible for local labour markets.

In the bigger picture, automation in the Pilbara has appeared to have led to production cost reductions of 15–25% as of 2025. This efficiency contributed to the Australian iron ore export value reaching $97 billion in 2025, representing nearly 40% of global supply.[15]

While the national economy benefits from these high margins, the physical workforce at these new automated sites are shrinking, possibly due to adoption models prioritising cost efficiency over headcount retention. Projections for large-scale autonomous operations (like those at BHP and Rio Tinto) indicate a 30–40% reduction in on-site workforce requirements as remote operations take over.[16,28]

As demand for physical labour has become locationally displaced, supply of trade-focused labour has remained tethered to location, which can create a large disparity and reinstatement delay on a town/city level. With new technical roles emerging for those with the applicable tertiary qualifications (analyst, engineer), reinstatement is severely constrained for the trade-focused employees at their present location. For example, Rio Tinto's WA workforce of ~19,000 is increasingly supported by a Perth-based operations centre, shifting high-value roles 1,500km away from the regional communities where the manual jobs were lost.[17,30,31]

As aforementioned, this displacement effect is not gradual, leaving local communities to adapt and exemplifying the regional labour issues in time. Concurrently, for every mining job lost in a regional town, there is a secondary impact on population-dependent services. A 30% reduction in a resident workforce typically triggers a proportional reduction in services that rely on households with disposable income.[18]

Generative AI and Diffuse Restructuring: Track 2

As opposed to Mining and Manufacturing robotics requirements, Track 2 is defined by the implementation of Generative AI in sectors such as retail and finance.

The deployment of generative AI tools frequently requires minimal capital expenditure, and is readily available and facilitates expedited deployment. Consequently, generative AI adoption appears much more widespread, and is not restricted to specific regions. This contributes to a geographically diffused impact on the labour market, stemming from an unstructured adaptation of modern business sectors to utilise the automation potential posed by AI.

The domestic Australian labour market shows Generative AI introducing an alternate change when compared to the trends observed from robotic industrialisation. Jobs and Skills Australia finds that generative AI is more likely to augment work than replace entire occupations, especially in the medium term. Task exposure analysis reveals that only about 4% of the workforce is in occupations with high automation exposure to Gen AI, while 79% are in roles with low automation exposure but medium to high augmentation potential.[19]

Contrary to the trends present in the mining and manufacturing sectors, Generative AI is low-friction and cheap to implement, as explored earlier in the paper. Across industries, adoption tends to be from individual workers experimenting on how to optimise their personal workflow, as opposed to structured workplace initiatives to adopt AI tools.

Moreover, the modular software-based method of AI mitigates the structural risks of capital depreciation and rapid asset obsolescence of the highly competitive automation market, as seen in the adoption of robotics. Transitioning between subsequent iterations of generative AI models does not demand firm-scale infrastructural overhauls. The capital friction of adoption remains negligible due software updates being deployed digitally, typically with zero marginal costs. This lack of implementation barrier enables a decentralised framework where administrative personnel individually experiment with tools to tailor user interfaces to their specific workflows, boosting performance. Hence, service sector firms successfully avoid the rigid asset commitment issues of heavy industry, achieving aggregate white-collar productivity gains through a web of small employee-led workflow efficiencies rather than a single capital shock.[20]

The impact varies significantly by occupation, industry, region, and demographic group. Basic occupations, entry level roles and administrative tasks have been frequently automated, with generative AI able to fulfill roles that demand low creativity. The ability to enhance productivity and easily reshape tasks, pressure workers to focus on higher value activities, possibly diminishing under-employment while doing an inequitable culling of lower value activities. The widespread nature of this AI adoption places increased importance on inherently human capabilities such as critical judgement, adaptability and unique creativity. These findings suggest that Australia's AI transition will involve both displacement and augmentation, and that the scale of disruption will depend on how effectively workers and industries adapt to the changing nature of tasks.[34,37]

Finance and Retail

Gen AI is reshaping tasks in risk assessment, fraud detection, software development, and customer service.

Financial and insurance services make up ~7.7% of GDP, and employ roughly 548,400 Australians, representing 3.7% of the total workforce.[21] It represents a primary stage for Track 2, with generative AI projected to contribute $48.9 billion to the domestic economy by 2030, driven by widespread adoption in risk assessment, software development, and fraud detection.[2]

The adoption structure within finance appears diffused and incremental, characterised by the integration of software-based tools into existing workflows. Unlike the embodied automation seen in Track 1, GenAI in this sector exhibits a higher augmentation-to-displacement ratio.

Nearly one-third of task hours in financial services could be automated by 2030, potentially meaning a requirement for jobs and roles within the sector to be redesigned, impacting the skills valued in the overall labour market.

Automation and Gen AI are also transforming supply chain optimisation and customer engagement.

Representing 4.1% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), the retail sector highlights the geographically diffuse nature of software-based automation. As one of Australia's largest em-

ployers, particularly for the vulnerable 15–24 youth demographic, the sector is undergoing a rapid structural transition. Retail was historically classified as a heavily interpersonal, manual service industry. However, recent data reveals a sharp pivot toward artificial intelligence to optimise inventory management and curate the customer experience such that a human would. This is underscored by the reality that 85% of Australian consumers now interact with automated digital interfaces during point-of-sale transactions rather than face-to-face with a human. Hence, the entry-level service positions that traditionally absorbed low-skilled youth labour are exhibiting symptoms of being systematically hollowed out, accelerating structural underemployment and a localised mismatch of skills across the domestic retail landscape.[35,38]

Case Study: Commonwealth Bank of Australia

While the baseline expansion of generative AI across the service economy is largely driven by decentralised, individual worker experimentation, the Commonwealth Bank of Australia (CBA) attempted a structured adoption program that exposed the operational frictions of Track 2.

In 2025, CBA announced the redundancy of 45 customer service roles in its direct banking division, with the deployment of its new AI-powered voice bot.

They claimed the bot had successfully reduced weekly call volumes, however, this faced resistance from the Finance Sector Union (FSU), who disputed the claim. In a subsequent dispute brought before the Fair Work Commission, union data revealed the bank's claims to be untrue, as aggregate call volumes were actually rising, forcing remaining staff into intensive overtime while team leaders were routinely diverted to phones to manage complex customer queries that the bot lacked the contextual adaptability to resolve.[22]

Consequently, in August 2025, CBA was forced into a high-profile structural rollback, publicly admitting it had miscalculated long-term call patterns, issuing an apology to the affected workforce, and rescinding the redundancies.[23] While CBA later pivoted to a proactive, three-year $90 million AUD "Future Workforce Program" in 2026 to encourage internal, elective skill portability via digital skill matrices, this situation provides a valuable academic case study.[24]

It demonstrates that rushing white-collar task substitution without thoroughly auditing human-system complementarities can trigger severe labour disruptions, union pushback, and operational failure, rather than seamless economic optimisation.

Synthesis

This evidence presented for these sectors suggests a conclusion that aligns with the proposed framework that the labour market disparity is closely tied to task-level automation.

Track 1, centred around robots, indicates regional displacement, as adoption is expensive, needing it to be heavily structured at a firm level and high friction.

Moving slowly, but in bursts, automation creates uneven and patchy trends that stem from concerns regarding capital depreciation and the risk of investing in technologies that may become obsolete as new developments are made, and ending with non-competitive technology in a mature market, due to an early decision.

Robotics substitutes for manual labour-heavy, trade tasks within jobs, and the effects are highly visible within localised communities, however diminished over the larger economy in relation to the job market. Regional communities are unable to reinstate jobs, and lose out to talent in alternate areas that are taking up the new slots forming to manage the automation.

Track 2, centred around Generative AI, indicates diffused restructuring as opposed to a need to meet sector-wide infrastructural demands. Its effects are broader across the national workforce, spreading unevenly across cognitive tasks such as retail and finance, but as seen in the CBA case, they allow for more fluid reinstatement and labour mobility.

Consequently, Australia is a unique dual-track case study. Our economic stability relies on a delicate balance, as we must harness the productivity of the concentrated robotics track while managing the skill-transition of the diffused AI track.

SOCIOECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS: FURTHER THAN LABOUR

Due to the dual-track nature of the technological adoption, the socioeconomic impact of this transition may be understood as a double edged sword. The non-uniform distribution of utility, where gains in sectoral efficiency are frequently offset by a deterioration in regional labour participation.

Social Implications

The automation of routine tasks through generative AI shifts the market premium of human labour toward high-order relation based, creative, and interpersonal roles. However, local Australian data demonstrates that this financial reward is not universal.[36]

According to the findings of the PwC Australia AI Jobs Barometer, the domestic wage premium for AI-augmented skill sets exhibits a unique distribution across different sectors rather than a uniform national average. While AI-proficient workers in highly cognitive fields like Financial Services and Advanced Manufacturing have a 43% and 57% wage premium respectively, the premium falls to just 8% in Energy, Utilities, and Resources.[25]

This divergence indicates that while administrative and technical personnel who successfully integrate these tools can offload routine data processing to expand their output, the financial upside is heavily biased towards knowledge focused economic sectors.

Fig 1: PwC Australia AI Skill Wage Premium % by Sector (2025)



Figure 1: PwC Australia AI Skill Wage Premium % by Sector (2025)

The domestic effect mirrors the polarisation dynamics identified in broader global literature. Acemoglu and Restrepo (2018) demonstrated that task displacement accounted for 50% to 70% of the structural changes in the United States wage architecture, where automation-driven declines in the industry labour share directly correlated with wage stagnation for non-tertiary workers.[7]

Within the Australian economy, wage growth is intensely isolated within high-skill, highly augmented professions where human judgement and oversight complement the software layer. Conversely, wages for routine, middle-skill positions remain stagnant or experience downward pressure, accelerating domestic income inequality by "hollowing out" the traditional middle class of the workforce.

Economic Implications

Australia's export wealth is more secure than ever due to Track 1. Automation in the Pilbara has reduced production costs by 15–25%, ensuring Australia retains its comparative advantage of iron ore production globally, even amidst fluctuating commodity prices.[12]

The $48.9 billion projected to be added by Gen AI to the domestic economy by 2030 provides the tax base necessary to fund the very reskilling programmes (like CBA's $90 million initiative) required to manage the transition.

Conversely, a critical economic downside of rapid software automation is the contraction of entry-level professional pathways. Recent insights from Fifth Quadrant (2026) report a 29% drop in entry-level corporate hiring, as small-to-medium enterprises (SMEs) leverage generative AI to automate foundational tasks historically allocated to interns and junior associates.[27] This trend underscores a systemic risk detailed by both Imas (2025) and Brynjolfsson et al. (2025): the erosion of the corporate apprenticeship ladder.[3,27] Firms use AI to automate basic summarisation and formatting, alongside initial code drafting. In doing so, they are slicing away the exact entry-level tasks that university graduates and interns traditionally used to build their foundational skill sets. Hence, short-term operational cost-cutting is creating a severe bottleneck in the human capital pipeline, leaving young Australians structurally locked out of the entry-level white-collar economy.

LIMITATIONS

This paper does have its constraints on its analysis depth and understanding.

Due to the niche that the paper's thesis aims to address, the novelty of automation and the specificity of Australia create a unique combination that does not have a swathe of readily available material available for literature review.

In conjunction with the paper's qualitative review, this greatly limits the data and numbers available for use, possibly leading to a partial/biased piece that relies on the small amount of already present and relevant information, piecing together a narrative based on various contextually related sources of information.

CONCLUSION

By focusing specifically on Australia, this paper has discussed the nature of automation, and has concluded that it is not an individual force, but rather an amalgam of unique technologies, notably industrial robotics and generative AI, that demonstrate divergent transitional trends within the Australian labour market. By applying a task-based framework to the domestic economy, this paper has illustrated how the dual-track nature of technological adoption can be associated with producing fundamentally different structural outcomes for the labour market, and how it does so.

Track 1 demonstrates the substitution effect of capital intensive, labour focused robotics, that results in the concentrated displacement of manual labour, typically within mining and manufacturing focused communities. Track 2 demonstrates the diffused restructuring of administrative tasks as simpler tasks are automated by AI, augmenting jobs within the financial and retail sectors.

This discrepancy in labour market impact within Australia is not a product of technological change in the aggregate, but rather a possible consequence of the specific task-bundles targeted by these distinct automation tracks. We can extrapolate from this Australian case study to suggest broader structural trends within advanced commodity-exporting and technology-driven economies. By using this localised evidence to disaggregate the two operational tracks, the paper illustrates that the primary economic challenge of the 21st century may not be a universal scarcity of work, but rather an acute geographic and sectoral mismatch of skills. Australia serves as a microcosm through which developed economies can be analysed for which track of automation they are facing and which negative externalities they should be working to mitigate.

Future research may extend this analysis by utilising primary quantitative data to more precisely track the trends of robotics and AI automation within the worksite and workplace, allowing for a stronger understanding of the impacts and externalities of such automation on domestic and global economies.

Ultimately, automation is not a single phenomenon, but a combination of robotics and generative AI, which each have a substitutionary effect and an augmentation effect of their respective applications in mining and administrative work. This approach is grounded in prior theory and empirical research. Both tracks create distinct labour market impacts in large, localised displacement, opposed to diffused job augmentation across a larger geographical area respectively. Therefore, the labour market adaptation cannot be one response, it must be multifaceted to account for the negative externalities that come with increased productivity from automation. While Track 1 demands targeted regional support to account for displacement, Track 2 requires structured reskilling initiatives to amplify the abilities of current employees and harness the potential of augmentative AI.

CONFLICTS OF INTEREST

The author declares that there are no conflict of interests related to this work.

WORKS CITED

Acemoglu, Daron, and Pascual Restrepo. "Robots and Jobs: Evidence from US Labor Markets." *Journal of Political Economy* 128, no. 6 (2020): 2188–244. https://doi.org/10.1086/705716.

Microsoft, and Tech Council of Australia. "Australia's Generative AI Opportunity: Healthcare, Manufacturing, Retail and Professional Services." Tech Council of Australia. Last modified 2024. https://techcouncil.com.au/wp-content/uploads/2023/07/Australias-Generative-AI-Opportunity-Report.pdf.

Brynjolfsson, Erik, Bharat Chandar, and Guangyu Chen. "Canaries in the Tech Mine: Early Generative AI Task Reallocation Patterns and Workforce Shifts." National Bureau of Economic Research. Last modified 2025. https://www.nber.org/papers/w32140.

Autor, David H. "Why Are There Still So Many Jobs? The History and Future of Workplace Automation." *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 29, no. 3 (2015): 3–30. https://doi.org/10.1257/jep.29.3.3.

Autor, David H., Frank Levy, and Richard J. Murnane. "The Skill Content of Recent Technological Change: An Empirical Exploration." *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 118, no. 4 (2003): 1279–333. https://doi.org/10.1162/003355303322552801.

Bessen, James. *Learning by Doing: The Real Connection Between Innovation, Wages, and Wealth.* New Haven: Yale University Press, 2015. https://yalebooks.yale.edu/book/9780300195668/learning-by-doing/.

Acemoglu, Daron, and Pascual Restrepo. "The Race Between Man and Machine: Implications for Growth, Factor Shares, and Employment." *American Economic Review* 108, no. 6 (2018): 1488–542. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20160696.

Australian Bureau of Statistics. "Australian National Accounts: State Accounts, 2024–25." Australian Bureau of Statistics. Last modified 2025. https://www.abs.gov.au/statistics/economy/national-accounts/australian-national-accounts-state-accounts/2024-25.

Australian Bureau of Statistics. "Australian System of National Accounts, 2024–25 Financial Year." Australian Bureau of Statistics. Last modified 2025. https://www.abs.gov.au/statistics/economy/national-accounts/australian-system-national-accounts/2024-25.

Australian Industry Group. "Manufacturing in Australia: Performance and Outlook Report 2025." Ai Group. Last modified 2025. https://www.aigroup.com.au/news/reports/2025/manufacturing-in-australia-performance-and-outlook-report-2025/.

Parliament of Australia. "Impacts of AI on Industry, Business, and Workers." Senate Select Committee on Adopting Artificial Intelligence. https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate/Adopting_Artificial_Intelligence/AI.

Straits Research. "Australia Mining Automation Market Forecast Analysis (2025–2031): Size, Share and Growth Trends." Straits Research. Last modified 2025. https://straitsresearch.com/report/australia-mining-automation-market.

BDO Australia. "Annual Mining Report 2025: Driving Sustainable Growth." BDO. Last modified 2025. https://www.bdo.com.au/en-au/insights/natural-resources/annual-mining-report.

RCT Global. "RCT's Automation Successfully Deployed in the Pilbara." RCT Global. Last modified February 20, 2025. https://rct-global.com/news/rcts-automation-successfully-deployed-in-the-pilbara/.

Symmetry Electronics. "Mining in the Automation Age: How Sensors and Connectivity Are Transforming the Industry." Symmetry Electronics Blog. Last modified November 12, 2024. https://www.symmetryelectronics.com/blog/mining-in-the-automation-age-how-sensors-and-connectivity-

BHP. "Annual Report 2025." BHP. Last modified 2025. https://www.bhp.com/investors/annual-reporting/annual-report-2025.

Minerals Council of Australia. "Digital Mines: The $700m Automation Frontier." MCA Reports. Last modified 2025. https://minerals.org.au/resources/digital-mines-the-700m-automation-frontier/.

ABC News. "Diversification the Key as Pilbara Towns Prepare for the Age of Mining Automation and Possible Population Impacts." ABC News. Last modified May 14, 2025. https://www.abc.net.au/news/2025-05-14/pilbara-towns-prepare-for-mining-automation-impacts/103842100.

Jobs and Skills Australia. "Generative AI Capacity Study: Task Exposure and Augmentation Potential in the Australian Economy." Australian Government. Last modified 2025. https://www.jobsandskills.gov.au/reports/generative-ai-capacity-study.

Jobs and Skills Australia. "Our GenAI Transition: Implications for Work and Skills — Generative AI Capacity Study Final Report." Australian Government. Last modified 2025. https://www.jobsandskills.gov.au/reports/generative-ai-transition-implications-work-and-skills.

Jobs and Skills Australia. "Employment Dataset Context." Australian Government. Last modified 2026. https://www.jobsandskills.gov.au/data/employment-dataset-context.

Staffing Industry Analysts. "Australia's Biggest Bank Reverses Plan to Replace Jobs with AI." Global Daily News. Last modified March 30, 2026. https://www.staffingindustry.com/news/australias-biggest-bank-reverses-plan-to-replace-jobs-with

Commonwealth Bank of Australia. "CBA Announces $90 Million 'Future Workforce' Initiative to Accelerate AI Integration." Commonwealth Bank of Australia Press Release. Last modified February 15, 2026. https://www.commbank.com.au/media/news/media-releases/2026/cba-announces-90m-future-workforce-initiative.html.

Commonwealth Bank of Australia. "Commonwealth Bank's $90m Plan for AI-Ready Workforce." CBA Newsroom. Last modified February 24, 2026. https:

//www.commbank.com.au/articles/newsroom/2026/02/cba-90m-plan-for-ai-ready-workforce.html.

PricewaterhouseCoopers Australia. "2025 AI Jobs Barometer: The Emergence of the AI Wage Premium in Australia." PwC Australia. Last modified 2025. https://www.pwc.com.au/media/2025/ai-jobs-barometer-wage-premium.html.

Fifth Quadrant. "The Downstream Squeeze: Shifting Entry-Level Corporate Hiring Trends in the Generative AI Era." CX & Workforce Insights. Last modified 2026. https://www.fifthquadrant.com.au/insights/downstream-squeeze-generative-ai-hiring-trends.

Imas, Alex. "Mentorship Bottlenecks: How Structural Automation Erodes the Apprenticeship Ladder in Knowledge Firms." *Journal of Economic Behavior* 42, no. 1 (2025): 88–104. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2024.10.012.

Discovery Alert. "BHP Scales Down Yandi Mine Operations After 34 Years." Discovery Alert. Last modified October 29, 2025. https://www.discoveryalert.com.au/bhp-scales-down-yandi-mine-operations/.

Discovery Alert. "Autonomous Haulage Systems Revolutionise Western Australia Mining Operations." Discovery Alert. Last modified March 24, 2026. https://www.discoveryalert.com.au/autonomous-haulage-systems-wa-mining/.

Government of Western Australia. "WA Economic Profile." Department of Jobs, Tourism, Science and Innovation. Last modified January 2026. https://www.wa.gov.au/government/publications/wa-economic-profile.

Western Australian Government. "Future-Facing Facility: The Future of Australian Mining Is Taking Shape at WA's New High-Tech Testing Centre." Department of Jobs, Tourism, Science and Innovation Media Statement. Last modified August 10, 2025. https://www.wa.gov.au/government/media-statements/Future-facing-facility-The-future-of-Australian-mining-is-taking-shape-at-WAs-new-high-tech-testing-centre.

Mine Australia. "Automation: How Smart Tools Are Reshaping Australian Mining." *Mine Australia*, no. 55 (May 2025). https://mine.nridigital.com/mine_may25/automation_smart_tools_australian_mining.

Productivity Commission. "Harnessing Data and Technology." Australian Government. Last modified October 7, 2025. https://www.pc.gov.au/inquiries/completed/data-technology/report.

Harvard Business Review. "Research: How Gen AI Is Already Impacting the Labor Market." *Harvard Business Review*. Last modified November 2024. https://hbr.org/2024/11/research-how-gen-ai-is-already-impacting-the-labor-market.

McKinsey & Company. "Australia's Automation Opportunity: Generative AI and the Future of Work in Australia." McKinsey & Company. https://www.mckinsey.com/featured-insights/australias-automation-opportunity-generative-ai.

Pearson. "Lost in Transition: Fixing the Skills Gap and the $104 Billion Automation Risk." Pearson Skills Outlook. Last modified 2025. https://www.pearson.com/en-au/insights/skills-outlook-automation-risk.html.

Telstra Corporation. "T25 Strategy Update: AI-Driven Network Management and Workforce Transition Report." Telstra Investor Centre. Last modified 2025. https://www.telstra.com.au/aboutus/investors/t25-strategy-ai-workforce-update.

Uplift Recruitment. "AI and Automation in the Australian Job Market." Uplift Recruitment. https://www.upliftrecruitment.com.au/blog/ai-and-automation-in-the-australian-job-market.